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NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from a decision and judgment in favor
of Plaintiffs/Respondents in a case that was heard before the
Honorable Judge Omer Call in the First Judicial District in Box
Elder County on November 9, 1984.

This was an action brought by

the Plaintiffs to foreclose a contract for the sale of real
property and the financing thereof by the Plaintiffs to the
Defendants/Appellants, the Smedley Family Investment Company with
Dale Smedley, its general partner.
DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT
The Court held that the Defendant had defaulted in its
payments under the contract and as a result the Plaintiffs could
treat the contract as a note and mortgage with the unpaid balance
due and payable.

The court issued a decree of foreclosure and

ordered the subject property to be sold at public auction.

The

court also awarded Plaintiffs attorney's fees and legal costs.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Appellants have carried their burden of

proof rebutting the presumption that the trial court's decision
is valid and correct and that the trial court has not clearly
abused its discretion in its decision that the contract was not
ambiguous.
2.

(a) Whether the Appellants have waived an affirmative

defense which they did not raise in the pleadings or at the trial
court level and are raising for the first time on appeal.
(b) Whether the Respondents fulfilled all necessary
prerequisites to foreclosure under the circumstances.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 15, 1981, the Plaintiffs/Respondents entered into a
contract to sell the Defendants/Appellants certain real property
located in Box Elder County and to finance the sale by permitting
the Defendants/Appellants to pay out the purchase price in installments over a seven-year period.

(A copy of the contract

appears in the record.)
The contract provided that the Appellant/Buyer would pay
$1.00 down, assume an obligation of the Plaintiffs/Respondents in
the aggregate amount of $99,976.09, with the $380,022.01 balance
of the purchase price plus interest accruing thereon to be paid
in monthly installments.

The contract gave the Appellant/Buyer

the opportunity to make these payments out of the sale of certain
additional real property being developed by the Appellant/Buyer.
If the developed property did not sell, the Appellant/Buyer was
nonetheless committed to complete payment on the balance by
making the installment payments over a seven-year period,
commencing on May 15, 1983 and ending on May 15, 1988.

(See

Section I.e. of the contract and R. 165-166.)
Beginning on September 15, 1983, Appellant/Buyer failed to
make its monthly installment payments as required under the
contract.

Respondents/Sellers gave written notice of default in

accordance with the contract provisions and advised Appellants
that under the acceleration clause of the contract, the entire
unpaid balance was immediately due and payable, and that unless
the sum was paid the contract would be treated as a note and

5

mortgage and an action to foreclose would be commenced as
provided in Section XI.C of the contract.
Respondents brought a foreclosure action and recorded a
Notice of Lis Pendens and a copy of the contract in the Box Elder
County land records.

Trial was held on November 9, 1984 before

the Honorable Judge Omer Call who found for the
Plaintiffs/Respondents.

(See R. 164-175.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Trial court, after hearing and considering the evidence,
determined that Section I.e. of the agreement was unambiguous and
clearly reflected the intentions of the parties.

The rule of

judicial review of a decision on appeal requires that the
appellant (1) rebut the presumption that the findings and
judgment of the trial court are valid and correct, (2) show that
such findings are clearly against the weight of the evidence, and
(3) prove such a serious inequity as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion.

The Appellants in this case have not carried their

burden of proof and therefore the findings and judgment of the
trial court should not be disturbed.
The Appellants raise in Point II of their argument an
affirmative defense that was required by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure to be raised in the pleadings or by motion in the trial
court, and if not raised at that time, to be waived.

Matters

neither raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at the trial
cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.

The failure

of the Appellants to raise this affirmative defense below serves
as a waiver by the Appellants to raise it on appeal.

In any event, the affirmative defense the Appellants raise
in their Point II regarding the passing of title to
Appellant/Buyer prior to instituting the foreclosure action is a
technicality that should not be used to unjustly enrich the
Appellants at the expense of the Respondents who have not
received the purchase price for the property they contracted to
sell.

If the Respondents had transferred title to

Appellant/Buyer, such transfer would have jeopardized the
Respondents

valid interest in the property.

The Utah Supreme

Court has followed the general rule that tender of a deed before
suit is not a condition precedent to a foreclosure action even if
it is technically required by the contract.

In addition, if the

Appellants had properly raised this issue at the trial court
level, the Respondents would have introduced evidence to prove
that the Respondents, before commencing the foreclosure action,
caused the contract to be recorded.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE APPELLANTS HAVE NOT CARRIED THEIR BURDEN OF REBUTTING THE
PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION AND HAVE
NOT SHOWN SUCH A SERIOUS INEQUITY AS TO MANIFEST A CLEAR ABUSE OF
DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT; THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD THEREFORE
BE UPHELD IN ITS FINDING THAT THE CONTRACT WAS NOT AMBIGUOUS.
The scope of appellate review is largely influenced by
certain presumptions, pre-eminent among which is that which
assumes the correctness of the decision appealed from the
regularity of the proceedings below.
Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P.2d 100 (Utah 1944).

The Utah Supreme

Court has stated that it is their duty to follow the cardinal
7

rules of judicial review, which the Court has defined as: to
indulge the findings and judgment of the trial court a
presumption of validity and correctness; to require the appellant
to sustain the burden of showing error; to review the record in
the light most favorable to those findings; not to disturb them
if they find substantial support in the evidence.
Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1981);
Charleton v. Hackett, 360 P.2d 176 (Utah 1961).
The Appellant has the burden of proving that such a serious
inequity has taken place on the trial court level as to manifest
a clear abuse of discretion and that the trial court findings are
clearly against the weight of the evidence.

Searle v. Searle,

522 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1974); Elton v. Utah State
Retirement Board, 503 P.2d 137, 137 (Utah 1972).

On appeal, the

burden is upon the appellant to convince the Supreme Court that
the trial court committed error and not that the appellant should
have won the case.

Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Assoc, 470

P.2d 393, 397 (Utah 1970)
The trial court in this case, after hearing and considering
the evidence, determined that Section I.e. of the agreement was
unambiguous and clearly reflected the intentions of the parties.
In their argument the Appellants do not even address the
question of whether the trial court abused its discretion.

The

Appellants merely cite rules of contract interpretation which are
not enough to overcome the well-settled presumption in favor of
the trial court's reading of the evidence.

In fact, a simple

reading of Section I.e. of the contract reveals that there is no

Q

ambiguity in the terms of payment of the purchase price agreed to
by the Appellant/Buyer.

As Judge Call stated in his decision on

this issue,
these people agreed that for two years there wouldn't
be any monthly payments required, even though interest
would be accruing ... they were ... saying if the sale
of the lots that Mr. Smedley owned or controlled, as
that was sold, could be applied to this contract. And
if they paid it all out, they paid it all out. But if
they didn't, then beginning in May of 1983 there was a
monthly payment due. And it would continue to be due
if the ... sales of Mr. Smedley "s lots didn't yield
enough to pay them, then the monthly payments came due
...[If] the ground that you say you will sell ... sells
fast enough to pay me, fine, I will accept that. But
if it doesn't, then two years hence I have got to start
receiving [payments] per month on the purchase price...
Transcript, pp. 165-166.
The Appellants have not carried their burden of proving that
Judge Call abused his discretion or committed substantial and
prejudicial error that deprived the Appellants of a full and fair
presentation of their case.

Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake

City v. Mitsui Investment Inc., 522 P.2d L370, 1374 (Utah 1974).
Nor have the Appellants proved that the finding was against the
weight of the evidence.

In the absence of such proof, the

findings and judgment of the trial court should not be disturbed.

POINT II.
A.
APPELLANTS FAILED TO RAISE IN THEIR ANSWER OR PUT IN ISSUE
AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE THEY ARE NOW
RAISING FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL; APPELLANTS HAVE THEREFORE
WAIVED ANY SUCH DEFENSE UNDER THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND SUCH DEFENSE MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL.
Rules 8(c) and 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
require defendants to present their affirmative defenses and
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objections in their responsive pleadings or by motion in the
trial court.

If the defendant does not raise a defense at that

time, he is deemed to have waived the defense.

Because an

affirmative defense raises matters outside the scope of the
plaintiff's prima facie case, such defenses must be pleaded and
failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the defense pursuant to
Rule 12(h).

Pratt v. Board of Education of Uintah County School

District, 569 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977); Tygesen v. Magna Water Co.,
375 P.2d 456 (Utah 1962).
Matters neither raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at
the trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.
Bundy v. Century Equipment Company, Inc., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah
1984).

The Utah Supreme Court explained the public policy

supporting the Rules of Civil Procedure cited above, as follows:
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final
settlement of controversies, requires that a party must
present his entire.case and his theory or theories of
recovery to the trial court; and having done so, he
cannot thereafter change to some different theory and
thus attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-round of
litigation.
Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 470 P.2d 399, 401 (Utah 1970).
It is axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the
parties in the trial cannot be considered for the first time on
appeal.

Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983).

a result of the Appellants' failure to plead, and hence their
waiver of the affirmative defense they are now attempting to
raise, the Appellants in this case are estopped from raising it
on appeal.

As

B.
THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE NOW BEING RAISED ON APPEAL FOR THE
FIRST TIME IN WHICH THE APPELLANTS ALLEGE THE TECHNICALITY THAT
RESPONDENTS FAILED TO DEED THE PROPERTY TO APPELLANTS BEFORE
FORECLOSING SHOULD IN ANY EVENT BE DECIDED IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS; EVIDENCE WOULD HAVE SHOWN THAT RESPONDENTS COMPLIED WITH
ALL NECESSARY PREREQUISITES TO FORECLOSURE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
The Appellants now belatedly raise the affirmative defense
that the Respondents failed to transfer title to the
Appellant/Buyer prior to the instituting the foreclosure action.
Although the Appellants did not raise this issue in their answer
as is required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore have waived this defense, if they had timely raised it, this
defense would have failed.
If the Appellants had properly raised this issue at the
trial court level, the Respondents would have presented evidence
showing that the contract itself was recorded prior to the
institution of the foreclosure action.

This made the equitable

rights of the Respondents/Sellers a matter of public record.
Transfer of the deed itself, which in any case was being held in
escrow, would have jeopardized the Respondents" valid interest in
the property.
Courts have held that tender of a deed before suit is not a
condition precedent to a foreclosure action.
and Purchaser, Section 427.

77 Am Jur 2d Vendor

The Utah Supreme Court followed this

general rule in a case also involving a Uniform Real Estate
Contract clause with the same wording as the contract involved in
this case.

(See Section XI.C. of the contract.)

Prudential

Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, v. King, 453 P.2d 697 (Utah 1969)
was an appeal from an action to foreclose a Uniform Real Estate
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Contract as a mortgage.

The Court upheld the assignment of the

contract and allowed the assignees to foreclose and get a
deficiency judgment despite the fact that the title was not
passed to the buyer before the foreclosure.
It has also been held that it is not necessary that the
seller tender a deed conveying title before a foreclosure suit,
since the buyer should not be permitted to hold the benefits of
his contract and at the same time refuse to perform.
Morman, 26 Wis. 588.

Mclndoe v.

So long as the seller is in a position to

tender the buyer a deed bearing marketable title in accordance
with the contract being sought to be foreclosed, he does not have
to actually tender the deed.

McLeod v. Hamilton, 254 Mich. 653,

236 N.W. 912.
The affirmative defense that the Appellants in this case
belatedly raise is a technicality that should not be used to
unjustly enrich the Appellants at the expense of the Respondents
who have not received the purchase price for the property they
contracted to sell.

The Respondents/Sellers agreed to finance

the sale to Appellant/Buyer at a very reasonable rate of
interest, thus allowing Appellant/Buyer to purchase the property
without turning to a bank or other financial institution.

The

Respondents should not now be penalized and the Appellants should
not be unjustly enriched because of a technicality regarding
which the courts have traditionally granted leeway.

"A court in

its wisdom may deem it proper and equitable to direct a judicial
sale of the property involved."

Walker v. Nunnenkamp, 373 P.2d

559, 568 (Idaho 1962).

1 ?

CONCLUSION
The finding and judgment of the trial court that Section
I.e. of the agreement was unambiguous and clearly reflected the
intentions of the parties should be upheld.

Appellants have not

carried their burden of rebutting the presumption that the
findings and judgment of the trial court are valid and correct,
showing that such findings are clearly against the weight of the
evidence, and proving such a serious inequity as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge.
The Appellants have not carried their burden of proof and
therefore the findings and judgment of the trial court should not
be disturbed.
The affirmative defense raised by the Appellants was
required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to be raised in the
pleadings or by motion in the trial court.
not raised at that time, it has been waived.

Since the defense was
Matters neither

raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at the trial cannot be
considered for the first time on appeal.
In any event, the affirmative defense the Appellants
belatedly raise regarding the passing of title to Appellant/Buyer
prior to instituting the foreclosure action is a technicality
that should not be used to unjustly enrich the Appellants at the
expense of the Respondents.

Such transfer would have jeopardized

the Respondents' valid interest in the property.

The Utah

Supreme Court has followed the general rule that tender of a deed
before suit is not a condition precedent to a foreclosure action
even if it is technically required by the contract. Appel-
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lant/Buyer should not be permitted to hold the benefits of its
contract and at the same time refuse to perform.
The Respondents respectfully submit that the trial court's
decision granting foreclosure should be affirmed.

DATED this

(

day of February, 1986

i.
y \ VV _
(TtXht S. vXu dlrim s
Attorney ffor Plaintiffs/Respondents
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